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LECTURE 
EXIT, VOICE, AND DISLOYALTY 
HEATHER K. GERKEN† 
INTRODUCTION 
This Lecture begins with a puzzle about Albert Hirschman’s 
famous work, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty:1 Why do we make much of 
exit and voice but utterly neglect loyalty? It’s a question that goes 
well beyond Hirschman’s book. For example, much of constitutional 
theory is preoccupied with a single question: What does a democracy 
owe its minorities? And most of the answers to this question fit 
naturally into the two categories Hirschman made famous: voice and 
exit. On both the rights side and the structural side of constitutional 
theory, scholars worry about providing minorities with an adequate 
level of influence. And the solutions they propose almost inevitably 
offer minorities a chance at voice or exit, as if no other option exists. 
The First Amendment, for instance, offers minorities the right to free 
speech (voice) and private association (exit). Similarly, structural 
arrangements give minorities the chance to vote in national elections 
(voice) and in state elections (exit). 
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 1. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
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Exit and voice are not, however, the only options available to a 
minority group seeking influence. That’s because much of the nation’s 
administrative structure looks more like Tocqueville’s democracy 
than Weber’s bureaucracy. In our highly decentralized and partially 
politicized system, minorities can wield influence over national policy 
because they routinely administer it.2 State officials regularly run 
federal programs, often with governors and state legislators serving 
nominally bureaucratic roles. Federal policy is often implemented by 
local juries and local prosecutors, state and local school boards, and 
state-created agencies. Because national minorities often constitute 
local majorities in the United States, these institutional arrangements 
ensure that those with outlier views help set federal policy. 
As policymaking insiders, minorities can resist federal policy 
from within rather than challenge it from without. A jury can nullify a 
law it dislikes. A state agency may be hostile to the federal law it is 
implementing. A school board can find ways to introduce religion 
into the classroom. Bureaucrats may administer an entitlements 
program in a less generous fashion than federal officials desire. Voice 
and exit thus aren’t the only paths of influence for minorities. 
Minorities can also exercise agency in their ongoing quarrel with the 
center because they are often the center’s agents.3 
Retooling Hirschman’s frame to include agency, then, doesn’t 
just draw our attention to an underappreciated avenue of minority 
influence. It raises questions as to why voice and exit have entirely 
dominated constitutional theory—why scholars who are interested in 
minority empowerment have overlooked the role that administrative 
arrangements can play in furthering that goal. We are all aware that 
bureaucrats wield power when they administer a program—we call it 
the principal-agent problem. And we are all aware that the principal-
agent problem can be particularly acute in the context of a partially 
politicized, highly decentralized system like our own. But the 
productive possibilities associated with the principal-agent problem 
have been neglected by constitutional theory. 
The notion of loyalty plays a role in explaining this neglect, 
though it isn’t the type of loyalty that Hirschman had in mind. 
 
 2. This is an argument about the relationship between the center and the periphery. Here 
I’ll focus on minorities’ influencing national policy, but the same basic arguments work with 
regard to minorities who wish to influence state policy. 
 3. I thus use the term agency to refer to minorities’ exercising control over the 
administration of national policy. I am intensely grateful to Tom Wolf for suggesting the 
formulation. 
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Because we typically think of administrative arrangements in 
Weberian rather than Tocquevillian terms, we treat bureaucratic 
resistance as an act of disloyalty—as a problem to be solved rather 
than a feature to be celebrated. We laud federalism and the First 
Amendment because they ensure a healthy level of resistance to an 
overweening national power, but when minorities use their 
administrative muscle to challenge national policy from within, we 
worry about parochialism or lawlessness. We assume, in short, that 
the principal-agent problem is always a problem. 
That is a mistake. Although the principal-agent problem 
certainly involves costs, these decentralized governing units constitute 
unique sites for minority influence. They blend features of voice and 
exit, offering minorities the decisionmaking control afforded by exit 
and the insider status associated with voice. Because agency gives 
minorities decisionmaking power within the federal system, it has 
unique implications for two of the most important projects 
undergirding much of constitutional theory: integrating a diverse 
polity and encouraging democratic debate. 
This Lecture is organized as follows. Part I explores the marked 
continuities between Hirschman’s frame and the strategies for 
empowering minorities that dominate constitutional theory. Part II 
explains why Hirschman’s third category, loyalty, is all but ignored by 
scholars and uses it as a starting place for identifying a third type of 
minority influence: agency. Part III returns to the notion of loyalty 
and considers why Hirschman—and most constitutional theorists—
have neglected this important avenue of minority influence. Part IV 
identifies some of the ways in which agency supplements, 
complements, and competes with voice and exit as a channel of 
minority influence. 
Two caveats are in order. First, in sketching out these claims, I 
necessarily offer some broad generalizations about the state of 
constitutional theory. There are, of course, exceptions to every rule, 
as the footnotes make clear. Second, many of the phenomena I 
discuss fall along a continuum.4 For ease of exposition, I will 
sometimes speak in categorical terms. Although those terms roughly 
 
 4. For instance, in discussing conventional federalism, I talk about state officials as 
“outsiders” to the national scheme when, of course, they are differently situated than true 
outsiders, such as officials from another country. I nonetheless think the distinction is useful, as 
it provides a means for identifying the difference between, say, state officials administering state 
law and state officials administering federal law.  
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capture the phenomena I’m describing at the level of generality I’m 
describing them, please keep in mind that these categories will 
inevitably blur at the margins and might disappear entirely if we kick 
the analysis up to a sufficiently high level of generality. 
I. EXIT AND VOICE 
In 1970 Hirschman penned his famous book, Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty. The book starts with a puzzle: “why the Nigerian railways 
had performed so poorly” even in the face of “active competition” 
from trucks.5 Hirschman builds on his observations about firm 
behavior to offer a free-form, wide-ranging disquisition on the 
sources of institutional change—or, as his subtitle reads, on 
“responses to decline in firms, organization, and states.” The book is 
itself an interesting window into scholarly norms; people just don’t 
write like that any more. The idea that you could move from a 
Nigerian railroad to firms to political parties to states is a bit startling 
to anyone deeply steeped in current disciplinary norms. 
In spite of—or perhaps because of—its wide-ranging, unbounded 
arguments, Hirschman’s account has become ubiquitous. Whether or 
not you accept his fox-like asides, the hedgehog’s point has held 
fast—that one can influence an institution by exercising either voice 
or exit. If one takes up Hirschman’s firm example,6 for instance, his 
analysis runs as follows: If your preferred soup manufacturer began 
offering a flawed product, what would you do? You could take 
advantage of the consumer’s exit option and buy a better soup from a 
competitor. Consumers’ exiting would induce the management to 
change lest the company lose more revenue. Or you could exercise 
voice, complaining about the soup’s shortcomings and pushing the 
company to adapt. 
Hirschman’s typology has proved to be especially useful in 
framing a variety of debates related to democratic design. As 
Hirschman observes, notions like exit and voice easily translate from 
the economic context to the democratic one.7 A voter, for instance, 
can push his political party to change by exiting—voting for the other 
party or just staying home. Or the voter can exercise voice, 
 
 5. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 1, at 44 (emphasis omitted).  
 6. Id. at 3–4.  
 7. Id. at 17–19, 70.  
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complaining about the party’s positions in the hope of spurring 
reform.8 
Unsurprisingly, Hirschman’s account is often invoked when we 
think about democratic arrangements, particularly when we are trying 
to answer that core question in constitutional theory: What does a 
democracy owe its minorities? Voice and exit offer deeply intuitive 
categories for classifying the dominant modalities we use to analyze 
the democratic influence that minorities wield. We see it on the 
structural side of constitutional theory, and we see it on the rights side 
as well. 
A. Exit and Voice in Constitutional Theory 
Here’s a highly stylized typology, one that is plainly debatable 
but offers at least one reasonable way to get traction on these issues. 
For those strange creatures who think more clearly with the help of a 
two-by-two matrix, here’s what it looks like: 
 
Table 1. Mapping Constitutional Theory onto Hirschman’s Categories 
 
 
Voice Exit 
Rights Right to free speech Right of association 
Structure Diversity/voting in a national election 
Federalism/voting 
in a state election 
  
1. Rights.  Let’s start with the rights side of the equation. It is 
easy to spot examples of voice and exit in the work of those who think 
about what rights a democracy owes its minorities. The right to free 
speech grants minorities voice—a chance to criticize national policy 
and perhaps to influence public debate. The First Amendment gives 
minorities a chance to be part of the national conversation. Forests 
have been felled in the name of accounts of this sort. Indeed, the 
marketplace of ideas—one of the major theories undergirding First 
Amendment doctrine—is premised on the idea that the right to speak 
 
 8. Id. at 30–33, 69–70. 
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allows dissenters to affect ongoing debates. Minorities may be 
outnumbered in this debate, but at least they will be heard. 
The First Amendment also offers minorities an exit option: the 
privacy afforded by the right to associate, which allows minorities to 
exit the public sphere for the private one in order to govern 
themselves (mostly) as they see fit.9 Although this exit option has 
typically been cast as a source of protection for minorities, it also fits 
Hirschman’s notion that exit constitutes a form of influence. If 
enough people leave the public for the private, the hope is that this 
exodus will cause policymakers to adapt.10 In some instances, exit also 
offers minorities a type of influence that Hirschman did not 
contemplate. It allows minorities to model an alternative 
policymaking vision to convince the center of its merits, or at least its 
viability. It is precisely when minorities are unhappy with the regime 
public governance has produced that they turn to private governance, 
where they are outside the system and can thus pursue their own 
utopias. The Amish are, of course, the canonical example, but there 
are examples everywhere. Parochial schools, for instance, show us 
what a religiously inflected education looks like. Private organizations 
favoring gay rights offer members of the LGBT community a 
different experience from that offered by a society that often 
discriminates against them. Private universities can adopt policies that 
public ones cannot. These alternative models are protected precisely 
because these associations are private and thus outside the 
government’s reach. And minorities can pursue a different course 
precisely because they enjoy majorities within these private 
organizations—they are not outnumbered, as they are in the public 
sphere. 
2. Structure.  Exit and voice are also easy to spot on the structural 
side of constitutional theory. On the exit side, we have federalism.11 
 
 9. For an exploration of the relationship between exit and association that pursues 
different arguments than those offered here, see Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice, and Exit: The 
Constitutional Bounds of the Right of Association, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 821 (2002). 
 10. Think, for instance, about public schools. I draw this example from HIRSCHMAN, supra 
note 1, at 45–47. 
 11. See, e.g., ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE (forthcoming 2013) 
(on file with the Duke Law Journal); Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 149 (1992); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 
317, 386–405 (1997); Clayton Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 
83 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1347–52, 1408–17 (1997); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE 
L.J. 1286, 1355 (2012); John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism v. States’ Rights: A Defense 
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At first glance, this claim might seem a bit startling because, if 
anything, we conventionally associate decentralization with voice 
rather than exit.12 The intuition is that by pushing decisions down 
from the national to the state (or local) level, we give individuals 
more of a chance to make their opinions known. 
If one thinks about federalism’s place in democratic theory, 
however, exit is a better way to describe it.13 That’s because 
federalism is at least in part a theory about what a democracy should 
do with its minorities. It’s a strategy for dealing with—even 
leveraging—diversity. All but one or two minor theories of federalism 
turn on the fact that national minorities constitute local majorities. 
States, for instance, are unlikely to constitute laboratories of 
democracy or facilitate Tieboutian sorting14 if the same types of 
people are making the decisions at the state and federal level. 
Similarly, ambition is unlikely to counteract ambition if state and 
national actors are united in their ambitions. 
If one thinks of federalism as a strategy for explaining what a 
democracy owes its minorities, it becomes clear that most theories of 
federalism stand in loosely for an idea that the best way to protect 
minorities in a majoritarian system is to give them an exit option, 
making space for them to enact their own policies separate and apart 
from the center.15 That is why some think that the very definition of 
federalism requires state sovereignty,16 and most assume that it at 
least demands a fairly high level of informal autonomy for states.17 
 
of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89–105, 110–12 (2004); Ernest A. 
Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 60 (2004); cf. Jonathan R. 
Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward 
a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 273 (1990). 
 12. Thanks to Richard Briffault for offering this formulation of what he takes (correctly) to 
be the conventional account in constitutional theory. 
 13. Some of these arguments are explored in greater detail, albeit from a different angle, in 
Heather K. Gerken, Foreword, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11–28 
(2010). 
 14. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416 (1956). 
 15. Exit, of course, is partial in the federalism context. As I note above, minorities are 
partial outsiders in the federalism context. See supra note 4. A full-exit option would 
presumably involve some form of secession.  
 16. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 11 
(1964); Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 19 (2002). 
 17. See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL 
IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 12 (2008); Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards 
of Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1681, 1681 (2008); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics 
Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 222 (2000); Larry 
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Here, it’s useful to compare federalism to its First Amendment 
cognate, the right to associate. We protect the right to associate 
precisely because we want to ensure that groups can create their own 
utopias. Autonomy creates space for disuniformity and dissent. The 
notion of autonomy has just as much pull on the structural side. We 
value it because it prevents the national majority from imposing its 
preference on local majorities. Just as the First Amendment protects 
minorities’ exit option on the rights side, sovereignty and autonomy 
protect minorities’ exit option on the structural side. 
Federalism’s emphasis on exit is also evident in scholars’ failure 
to push federalism theory all the way down to juries, school boards, 
zoning commissions, state agencies, locally elected sheriffs, and the 
like.18 Given its focus on minority-dominated governance, you might 
think that federalism would naturally look to local, substate, and 
sublocal institutions as sites of minority rule. After all, given that 
most states are fairly populous, minorities have a better chance of 
ruling at the local level. But while some scholars have argued that 
federalism should extend to cities,19 they have not carried that insight 
to its logical conclusion and included special-purpose, administrative 
units within federalism’s ambit.20 
The reason for this neglect, in my view, is the salience of exit to 
federalism theory. These administrative units seem unlikely sites for 
“Our Federalism” to anyone influenced by an exit account. An exit 
account pivots off an image of minorities’ presiding over their own 
empires rather than administering someone else’s; it focuses on the 
power of minorities to put in place policies that the center cannot 
touch. Administrative units are, almost by definition, not sites for 
exit. They are part of the system, not outside of it. While minorities 
wield control, the power they wield is not their own. When minorities 
set policy within these administrative units, they aren’t setting policies 
 
Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1513 (1994); D. Bruce La Pierre, 
The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as 
Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779, 786 (1982); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From 
Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 
416; Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1349, 1358 
n.42, 1385 (2001).  
 18. Gerken, supra note 13, at 22. 
 19. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns 
in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1304 (1994). Many have extended the 
insights of federalism to cities. See id. at 1304–05, 1310–16 (collecting sources). 
 20. Gerken, supra note 13, at 22–27. 
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that are shielded from the center; they are setting policies for the 
center. 
One might respond that the neglect of these administrative units 
has nothing to do with exit. Federalism is, by definition, about states; 
it’s a definition rooted in the text and history of the Constitution. But 
that response is too simple. For better or for worse, federalism theory 
has moved well beyond arguments about the text and history of the 
Constitution, arguments that would naturally confine theories of 
federalism to states. Instead, federalism theory now largely turns on a 
set of functional justifications for valuing minority rule.21 And if one 
thinks only about the functional, it’s quite natural to think about 
federalism’s values for institutions below the state level. That’s why 
scholars have already proposed grouping cities with states in thinking 
about federalism.22 But although scholars have moved beyond states, 
they have stopped with cities.23 
That’s not a coincidence. Cities are the one other institution that 
can conceivably offer a robust exit option.24 Like states, they are sites 
of general jurisdiction—units where we can imagine minorities’ ruling 
themselves, separate and apart from the center. Like states, cities 
enjoy some level of formal and informal autonomy,25 so that 
 
 21. Federalism, for instance, is thought to promote choice, competition, participation, 
experimentation, and the diffusion of power. E.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458–59 
(1991); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context, 47 
VAND. L. REV. 1229 (1994); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double 
Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 136–39 (2001); Steven G. Calabresi, “A 
Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 752, 774–79 (1995); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State 
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–10 (1988); Young, supra 
note 11, at 52–63; Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491–1511 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE 
FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)). Some believe we reel these arguments off too easily. See Barry 
Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 318–19 (1997).  
 22. Richard Briffault makes precisely this point. Briffault, supra note 19, at 1305; see also 
Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New Approach to 
Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 218 (1996).  
 23. Richard Briffault is the exception, as he has written on economic institutions at the 
sublocal level. See generally, e.g., Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business 
Improvement Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365 (1999); Richard 
Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L. REV. 503 (1997). 
 24. How robust an exit option they offer is up for debate. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our 
Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1990); 
Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1069–72 (1980). 
 25. Many cities enjoy “home rule” provisions whose utility is a subject of intense debate in 
local government law. Compare David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
2257, 2263 (2003), David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, Defensive Localism: A View of the Field 
GERKEN IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 3/17/2013  3:47 PM 
1358 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1349 
minorities who govern them can meaningfully be understood as 
presiding over empires of their own. And notice what remains outside 
of federalism theory. It’s the substate and sublocal institutions that 
constitute states and cities—juries, school committees, zoning 
commissions, locally elected prosecutors, and the like. These are the 
institutions where exit is not to be had. 
As with the right to associate, federalism is not just a source of 
protection for minorities. It also offers minorities a path of influence. 
First, consistent with Hirschman’s account, minorities can signal their 
unhappiness with national policies by pursuing different policies at 
the state level. Second, minorities can dissent by deciding;26 they can 
offer a real-life instantiation of their ideas by, say, licensing same-sex 
couples to marry or enacting strict abortion laws. 
We also see the voice model on the structural side. It’s the 
diversity model—an institutional-design strategy often invoked by the 
nationalists, who are deeply skeptical of federalism. Here again, this 
may seem like a startling claim at first. Diversity and federalism are 
not typically paired in this fashion. But, again, if one views these 
institutional design strategies through the lens of democratic theory, 
diversity is properly understood as a strategy that grants minorities 
“voice” in the decisionmaking process. 
Here I think the argument is easiest to understand if we back 
into it and start by thinking in institutional terms about what a 
conventional nationalist thinks a democracy owes its minorities. What 
is federalism’s institutional competitor? Proponents of federalism and 
nationalism both favor a basic baseline of rights. But when it comes to 
structure, nationalists—disgusted with federalism’s past—gravitate to 
an idea familiar to all of us: the diversity paradigm. The idea is simple 
and intuitive: that decisionmaking bodies ought to mirror the 
population from which they are drawn—they ought to look like 
America, to use Bill Clinton’s favorite phrase. 
Diversity is the rough cognate to the voice model. It offers 
minorities a subset of seats or votes on every decisionmaking body. It 
thus gives minorities the opportunity to make their views heard, even 
if they can’t control the outcome. Indeed, proponents of diversity 
 
from the Field, 21 J.L. & POL. 261, 261–62 (2005), and Frug, supra note 24, at 1059–60, with 
Briffault, supra note 24, at 7.  
 26. See generally Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 
(2005). 
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often invoke the “dignity of voice” in making the pitch for including 
minorities on various decisionmaking bodies.27 
3. The Voting Conundrum.  One might, of course, balk at the way 
I’ve classified these structural arrangements. The right to speak and 
the right to associate map pretty neatly onto Hirschman’s categories. 
But structural arrangements fit more loosely. While Hirschman 
imagined that voters could “exit” their party by voting for a 
competing party, one might still insist that voting under the diversity 
model shouldn’t be equated with “voice.” After all, when you vote, 
you are part of the decisionmaking process, not just complaining 
about it. 
Fair enough. The typology is, as I said, a loose one, and 
Hirschman himself didn’t identify exactly how voting fits into his 
scheme. If you think voting absolutely disqualifies structural 
arrangements from being included in Hirschman’s typology, you can 
stop here. But there’s good reason for a bit of flexibility here. While 
voting is a pervasive feature on the structural side, there are different 
variants of voting, and Hirschman’s scheme helps us map them. 
One can, for instance, make a sensible case that, at least for 
political minorities,28 voting under the diversity paradigm looks a 
good deal like voice. Political minorities are, by definition, the losers 
when a national vote is taken. If political minorities didn’t vote at all, 
the decision would still get made, and it would still be a decision they 
oppose. Voting in this context is a form of protest—a way to signal 
unhappiness with the decision. This signal may influence future 
debates, but it won’t affect the decision on the table.29 
Similarly, voting under federalism looks a lot like exit. As I noted 
above, we conventionally think that pushing an issue down to the 
state level gives minorities more “voice” over the decision. When 
 
 27. See, e.g., ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE 79 (1995); Jane Mansbridge, 
Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent “Yes,” 61 J. 
POL. 628, 628 (1999); Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: 
EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994). 
 28. To be sure, one might resist the idea that the classification may work only for political 
minorities. Hirschman’s arguments are cast in individualist terms. To the extent he contemplates 
group action, he assumes that voters and consumers will take a roughly similar view of the 
problem. The variation on which Hirschman focuses is the different ways people react to an 
agreed-upon problem. 
 29. Unless, of course, we are talking about smaller decisionmaking bodies, where 
dissenters may trade away their dissenting votes in exchange for compromises from the 
majority. Gerken, supra note 26, at 1746–47. 
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people use the term voice, they are really thinking about influence. 
But Hirschman’s key insight is that we can distinguish between 
avenues of influence. And there is a crucial difference between voting 
and “voting with one’s feet”—between the diversity model and 
federalism. Under the diversity model, minorities inevitably cast a 
losing vote. Federalism, in contrast, gives minorities the chance to 
win—to form local majorities and exercise a decisive vote rather than 
merely “voice” their concerns. What some term “voice” is better 
understood as control. 
Note, however, that under conventional models of federalism 
minorities don’t exercise control over national policy; they exercise 
control over state policy. The price of the power to control is outsider 
status. Unlike the diversity model and the right to free speech, it’s a 
form of influence available only outside the national sphere. It thus 
bears a close resemblance to the right to associate, which grants 
minorities the power to govern themselves only when they move 
outside the public sphere to the private one. 
 
*** 
 
No matter where we look, then, voice and exit capture the 
dominant modalities for thinking about what avenues of influence a 
democracy owes its minorities. While Hirschman didn’t invent these 
ideas, he offered a deeply intuitive framework for sorting and 
comparing them. Little wonder, then, that Hirschman’s categories are 
so often invoked by constitutional theorists. 
II. RETHINKING HIRSCHMAN’S FRAMEWORK 
A. What About Loyalty? 
For all of Hirschman’s success with voice and exit, his third 
category—loyalty—turned out to be a bust. Just ask yourself this: Can 
you even remember what Hirschman said about loyalty? In an 
informal survey of colleagues, I’ve found that even those who can 
recite other parts of the book, chapter and verse, often have only the 
vaguest of ideas about what Hirschman said about loyalty. The same 
holds true of the scholarly literature. The vast majority of citations to 
Hirschman emphasize exit and/or voice, as if the third word of the 
book’s title had been excised. 
Hirschman was admittedly somewhat imprecise in his 
formulation. But I think our collective amnesia is due largely to the 
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fact that Hirschman cast loyalty as a cushion against hasty exits.30 The 
notion of loyalty helped Hirschman think about why everyone 
doesn’t just take the easy exit option—why some cling to a brand or 
an organization in the hope that voice will eventually put it back on 
the right track. 
You can see why Hirschman, the economist, might worry. As 
long as you know there’s a decent competitor out there, exit is usually 
easier—or at least more certain—than voice. Animating Hirschman’s 
account of loyalty is a worry about what happens when an 
organization screws up and exit is easy.31 Customers might exit en 
masse when a firm makes its first bad product, and a perfectly good 
company would never get a chance to recover. You can see the worry 
on the political side as well (though here it seems less realistic). If exit 
is too prevalent, running one lousy candidate will sink the party, 
leaving nothing in its wake. Loyalty raises the cost of exit and thus 
cushions the potential blow that exit can inflict. 
I have no quarrels with Hirschman’s account of loyalty. But I 
think the reason people forget this part of the book is that loyalty, in 
Hirschman’s view, wasn’t an avenue of influence; it was a cushion 
against it. 
Although Hirschman thought loyalty would dampen influence, 
one can find stray references in his work that hint of a quite different 
possibility—the possibility that there might be another avenue of 
influence beyond voice and exit. If you read Hirschman closely, he 
drops interesting observations about the relationship between loyalty 
and influence. He notes in passing that those most loyal to the 
organization are most likely to have their voices heard by its 
management.32 At some points in the book, he vaguely links loyalty to 
membership and decisionmaking—momentarily moving away from 
the passive, consumer-oriented account he deploys in most of the 
book—and ever so briefly contemplates that members might have 
some direct role in the decisionmaking process.33 
Admittedly, the bits and pieces I’m discussing aren’t really what 
Hirschman meant by loyalty, and his observations along these lines 
are fragmentary and largely unexplored. But they nonetheless point 
up the possibility of taking Hirschman’s framework in a different 
 
 30. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 1, at 78. 
 31. Id. at 79. 
 32. See id. at 77. 
 33. Cf. id. at 98–105.  
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direction, one that pivots off notions like loyalty, membership, and 
belonging in thinking about channels of democratic influence. 
B. A Third Avenue of Influence: Agency 
1. National Minorities As National Agents.  In order to think 
about this third avenue of minority influence, we need to set aside the 
notion that dominates Hirschman’s thinking. He writes as if everyday 
citizens were situated politically much as they are economically—
atomized, largely passive consumers of whatever political products 
are offered to them. Hirschman imagines voters having little to do in 
the democratic process save accept or reject the positions forged by 
political elites. 
What Hirschman’s account misses is that citizens don’t just vote 
on competing visions of what national policy ought to look like. In 
our highly decentralized and partially politicized bureaucracy, citizens 
help make national policy. Citizens do so directly when they serve on 
juries, sit on locally oriented school boards and zoning commissions, 
or function as “street-level bureaucrats.”34 And they do so indirectly 
by electing state and local politicians who serve a nominally 
bureaucratic role and thus can staff more (or less) cooperative 
agencies to carry out federal policy.35 
The fact that citizens implement federal policy indirectly or 
directly wouldn’t much matter to those concerned with the influence 
minorities wield in a democracy but for one fact: residential patterns 
in this country are lumpy. In many places, national minorities 
constitute local majorities. This means that in some parts of the 
system, minorities wield control over the national policymaking 
apparatus, giving minorities an opportunity to administer the very 
federal policies with which they disagree. 
Minorities thus have lots of opportunities for setting policy 
rather than merely complaining about it—lots of opportunities for 
controlling federal law from within rather than challenging it from 
without. Precisely because minorities serve as the center’s agents, 
 
 34. MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN 
PUBLIC SERVICES 3 (1980) (emphasis omitted).  
 35. Note the parallel here. As with exit and voice, agency takes two forms: one involves 
direct participation (serving on a jury or school board), and the other involves representation 
(voting for someone to administer federal law on one’s behalf). So, too, voice and exit involve 
direct participation (the right to speak or form a private association) and representation (voting 
under the diversity paradigm or under federalism). 
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minorities can do more than exercise voice or exit when they disagree 
with the center’s policies: they can exercise agency. 
Our system is rife with examples of one set of decisionmakers 
setting policy at the center and another, quite different, set of 
decisionmakers implementing it at the periphery. These 
decisionmaking bodies are usually charged with implementing a 
legislative or executive mandate—a jury applying the law enacted by 
Congress, a school board implementing the policy set by the 
Department of Education. The chance to register disagreement 
through a decision—to “dissent by deciding”36—emerges ad hoc, 
either by the grace of the majority or out of practical necessity. Juries, 
for instance, can render a decision only within a range set by the 
legislature. State environmental agencies carry out duties that the 
federal government assigns to them. School boards implement policy 
within a range set by a central policymaker. 
Opportunities for agency do not, however, depend entirely on 
the willingness of the majority to cede some discretion to the lower-
level decisionmakers. Disaggregated institutions are a solution to the 
problem of mass governance. Central decisionmakers must give some 
discretion to lower-level decisionmakers to interpret and implement 
the majority’s decrees. Juries, school boards, city governments, state-
created bureaucracies—all serve as agents of the national 
government. And in the gap between the policy and its administration 
often lies a sizeable amount of discretion for those on the periphery, 
the opportunity to regulate as they see fit, to “edit” the policy that 
they lack the power to “authorize.”37 In these innumerable nooks and 
crannies, there are many places where geographically concentrated 
minorities can exercise power. Residential segregation is something 
we often mourn in this country, and with good reason. But in a 
decentralized system like our own, these clusters also provide 
minorities with an avenue of influence. 
 
 36. Gerken, supra note 26, at 1749.  
 37. I borrow these terms from Philip Pettit. See Philip Pettit, Republican Freedom and 
Contestatory Democratization, in DEMOCRACY’S VALUE 163, 164 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano 
Hacker-Cordón eds., 1999). Pettit, however, uses them in a slightly different context, discussing 
the need to grant electoral minorities the opportunity to “edit” the law by contesting it in an 
acceptably neutral process—such as a proceeding before a judge, a jury, or an administrative 
agency—and thereby to vindicate what he terms a “contestatory” or “oppositional” model of 
democracy. Id. at 183–85. His conception of dissent focuses more on elites and less on a populist 
conception in which the people speak for themselves.  
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Cooperative federalism is thus paired with uncooperative 
federalism.38 Cooperative localism is paired with local resistance.39 
The people who are nominally state and federal bureaucrats include 
state legislators and everyday citizens, decisionmakers who pair 
expertise with politics, and those whose jobs are all but entirely 
political. Even in highly centralized, highly technocratic federal 
bureaucracies, we see state and local variation in carrying out what 
otherwise seem like routinized policy jobs.40 The rebellion of the 
street-level bureaucrat is hardly confined to the street. 
In each of these examples, the decisionmakers in question serve 
two masters, not one. They are nominally the agents of the federal 
government. But they are differently composed and thus draw their 
power from a different power base than those at the center—a 
randomly drawn jury carrying out a congressional command, local 
school officials carrying out the president’s education policy, a 
bureaucracy created by a state whose political leadership is hostile to 
the federal mandate. 
One might argue that this sort of decisionmaking power isn’t 
really a form of influence because, in sharp contrast to voice and exit, 
agency involves minorities controlling rather than merely influencing 
decisions as to how national policy gets implemented. But remember 
that the decision over which they exercise control isn’t “the” decision. 
As I describe in greater detail below, minorities aren’t changing 
national policy; they are changing parts of it, with the aim of 
influencing national policy in its entirety going forward. Indeed, at 
some level of generality, agency promotes minority influence in much 
the same way as voice and exit do: it allows minorities to signal 
dissent and model an alternative approach. If parents can influence 
policymakers by exiting the public school system, bureaucrats can do 
the same by opting out of a federal program. If minorities can 
influence the national debate with an editorial, they can do the same 
 
 38. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 
YALE L.J. 1256, 1259 (2009). 
 39. See Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era 
of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 960 (2007). 
 40. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on 
the Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND 
EXPERIENCES 115, 142–44 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006); John T. Scholz, Jim Twombly & 
Barbara Headrick, Street-Level Political Controls over Federal Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 829, 831–32 (1991); see also LIPSKY, supra note 34, at 13. 
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by engaging in jury nullification or licensing same-sex couples to 
marry. 
2. Beyond Voice and Exit.  If you think that minorities’ 
administrative roles offer them channels for influencing national 
policy, it’s not hard to imagine why minorities might find these 
channels valuable. Think about the options that are otherwise on the 
table. On the structural side, constitutional theory offers us a choice 
between voice and exit. When you are part of the national system, the 
diversity paradigm (roughly) governs.41 The political power minorities 
wield is, at least in theory, roughly proportional to their share of the 
national vote. When we lay the diversity model down next to its main 
institutional competitor, federalism, one can immediately see what’s 
odd about this strategy for empowering minorities: diversity 
relentlessly reproduces in governance bodies the same inequalities 
that minorities experience pretty much everywhere else. On any 
politically salient issue on which the minority and majority routinely 
divide, minorities voting in national elections are destined to be 
political losers. 
You can see, then, the attractions of the exit option that 
federalism offers. Federalism gives minorities the chance to be the 
majority. It gives them more than influence at the local level; it gives 
them control. But note that this benefit comes with a price. Minorities 
must exit the national system—they must work at the state level—in 
order to exercise that power. Their power is protected, in fact, 
precisely because they are outsiders; sovereignty and autonomy are 
keyed to it. Indeed, sovereignty and autonomy arguably reify 
minorities’ outsider status. The decisions that minorities render are 
protected precisely because they are the decisions of a state polity, 
not “the” national polity. Under federalism’s exit option, minorities 
get to wield governmental authority, but they don’t get to wield it on 
behalf of the national government. 
Roughly the same set of trade-offs obtains on the rights side of 
the equation. Minorities have the right to speak and to petition their 
government. When they do so, however, they lack the ability to 
control the decisionmaking process. That sort of power comes, if at 
all, only when minorities take an exit option and create a private 
 
 41. I used the weasel word roughly because we elect congressional representatives from 
states and districts and the president via the electoral college, which ensures that particular 
minorities do better than their numbers would otherwise suggest. 
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association to govern themselves along the lines the majority has 
rejected. And the decisions of that association are protected precisely 
because they are private. If minorities begin to wield public authority, 
they also begin to lose the protections the First Amendment 
provides.42 
If one begins to compare the relative costs and benefits of voice 
and exit, one can see that there may be instances in which political 
minorities might like to wield the power exit confers—control, not 
just voice—without having to exit to the state or to the private sphere. 
Minorities might sometimes prefer to help administer the federal 
empire than administer an empire of one’s own, to serve as a 
policymaking insider rather than an autonomous outsider, a critic 
from within rather than a dissenter from without. 
As with exit and voice, there is a price to influence that takes this 
form. Agency gives minorities the power to make decisions, but—in 
sharp contrast to the exit model—those decisions are not shielded 
from reversal. The center can—and sometimes does—overrule the 
periphery. 
All three channels of influence involve trade-offs. Voice offers 
insider status without majority status. Exit does the reverse. Agency 
offers both majority and insider status, but the power that minorities 
wield is that of the servant rather than the sovereign, the agent rather 
than the principal. The decisions minorities make in an integrated 
policymaking regime are thus not protected from reversal.43 
For those who prefer a matrix, here’s a rough breakdown: 
  
 
 42. The canonical case is Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).  
 43. Certain types of jury verdicts, such as “not guilty” verdicts in criminal cases, are an 
exception. 
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Table 2. Mapping Exit, Voice, and Agency 
  
 Exit Voice Agency 
Status Outsider Insider Insider 
Decisionmaking 
control/majority 
status 
Yes No Yes 
Protection from 
reversal Yes Yes No 
 
One might, of course, think that the power of the servant isn’t a 
form of power at all. What good does it do to enact a policy if it is not 
shielded from reversal? I spend a lot of time in a recent paper arguing 
that the power of the servant is actually quite important.44 Just ask 
any administrative-law scholar, or indeed, anyone who has written on 
the principal-agent problem. The power of the agent is different from 
that of the principal—agency is different from exit—but it is power 
nonetheless. 
I won’t offer a full survey here,45 but let me sketch a couple of 
reasons why the power of the servant matters—why agency can 
sometimes offer minorities a robust channel of influence. One reason 
that servants are powerful is that the center depends on them to get 
anything done. Members of Congress and the president can’t 
personally ensure that every one of their policies is implemented 
perfectly. They can exercise their political capital here and there, but 
they have to pick and choose, and ultimately they are dependent on 
others to put their policies into place. That leaves room for minorities 
to push back against federal mandates. 
 
 44. See Gerken, supra note 13, at 33–44.  
 45. For more developed arguments, see id. at 33–44, 68–71; and Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, 
supra note 38, at 1265–71. 
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Servants are also powerful precisely because they are integrated 
in the system rather than standing outside of it. State and local 
officials can take advantage of the web of connective tissues that bind 
the periphery to the center. Moreover, insider status gives state and 
local officials standing—in the colloquial sense—to challenge the 
center. They can voice dissent from within the system, base their 
claims on shared expertise and experience, and cast that dissent in 
terms readily comprehensible to the relevant decisionmakers. They 
thus resemble Michael Walzer’s “connected critics.”46 Walzer insists 
that an effective critic must be “[a] little to the side, but not outside” 
of the community she challenges, as her ability to dissent effectively 
will depend on her ties to the community.47 So, too, minorities who 
exercise agency are a little to the side but not outside the system and 
thus capable of dissenting in a fashion that true outsiders cannot. 
Finally, servants may be better able to provoke a response from 
the center than the prototypical dissenter, precisely because they are 
inside rather than outside the system. It’s often relatively easy to 
ignore a contrary policy when that policy is put in place elsewhere. 
It’s harder to ignore outliers when they are in your midst. California 
and the United States can ignore the Netherlands when it licenses 
same-sex couples to marry, but they can’t do the same when the City 
of San Francisco does so. When minorities exercise agency, they 
thwart the uniform administration of federal law and create the risk 
that other federal “agents” will demand a similar exemption. It is also 
irritating to see one’s own monies hijacked to challenge the very 
policy those funds are supposed to promote. As Jessica Bulman-
Pozen and I observe elsewhere, “[m]odus vivendi is less palatable 
when funded out of your own pocket.”48 
III. WHY THE GAP IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY? THE 
COMPLEXITIES OF LOYALTY 
If one accepts the notion that agency represents a third path of 
minority influence, the natural question is why it’s been neglected by 
constitutional theorists. We have a field devoted to cooperative 
 
 46. MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 39 (1987). 
 47. Id. at 61. 
 48. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 38, at 1287; cf. Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the 
New Hampshire Republican Primary Debates (Feb. 23, 1980) (“I am paying for this 
microphone . . . !”); State of the Union (Liberty Films 1948) (“Don’t you shut me off; I’m paying 
for this broadcast.” (quoting Spencer Tracy’s character)). 
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federalism but we neglect uncooperative federalism. We have a field 
devoted to thinking about dissent from without but we neglect dissent 
from within.49 We think a great deal about the role minorities play in 
making national policy but not about the role they play in 
implementing national policy.50 
A. Minding the Gap 
We don’t just neglect this avenue of influence; we disparage it. 
We call it the principal-agent problem and treat it as a nuisance to be 
solved rather than a phenomenon to be celebrated. We romanticize 
the solitary dissenter, but we have no celebratory term for what 
happens when local dissenters join together to put their policies in 
place. Instead, the only terms we have are negative. We term those 
places where dissenters dominate as “lawless” or “parochial.”51 
This isn’t just a nominalist claim; it’s a substantive one. Why is it 
that those who care about dissent have largely ignored minority-
dominated governance in thinking about the question of minority 
empowerment? Why do they stick with a rights-based account of 
what a democracy owes to its minorities? Dissenters have long used 
local concentrations of power to build support for their positions. For 
example, much of the work on gay rights has been done at the local 
level. The Supreme Court has even given us a case to think about the 
issue.52 To top it all off, theorists of dissent do think about the values 
associated with minority-dominated institutions in the private sphere, 
 
 49. First Amendment scholars have thought about the rights of whistleblowers, of course, 
as well as the rights of government employees. See generally, e.g., Rosalie Berger Levinson, 
Silencing Government Employee Whistleblowers in the Name of “Efficiency”, 23 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 17 (1996); Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 
1007 (2005); Gia B. Lee, First Amendment Enforcement in Government Institutions and 
Programs, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1691, 1766-71 (2009); Helen Norton, Constraining Public 
Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech To Protect Its Own Expression, 
59 DUKE L.J. 1 (2009); cf. supra note 42. They are insiders in some senses, but not in the sense I 
describe here (individuals who are such deeply involved insiders that they control the levers of 
power). 
 50. Administrative law scholars have done a good deal of work on this topic, although most 
focus on different issues than those discussed here. 
 51. Nestor M. Davidson offers the term “lawless localities” in his efforts to critique it. 
Davidson, supra note 39, at 1017–26. For a similar critique challenging the “usual parochialism 
story” that depicts localities as hostile to religious minorities, see Richard C. Schragger, The 
Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 
1815 (2004).  
 52. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). The case has been cast in these terms by scholars 
of local government law, but not by constitutional theorists. 
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where work on associational rights and pluralism places great 
emphasis on what a democracy owes its minorities. So why don’t 
these scholars think about minority-dominated governance—
“pluralism” within the public sphere—as yet another tool for minority 
empowerment? 
Or consider federalism, the one theory in constitutional law that 
depends on, even glories in, the notion that national minorities 
constitute local majorities.53 Federalism, as noted above, is so closely 
tied to an exit account that it mostly neglects the administrative 
arrangements I describe here—those in which state and local officials 
implement federal law in an integrated policymaking regime. And 
even when scholars turn to these administrative arrangements, the 
term we use to describe them is cooperative federalism. 
Here again, this isn’t just a nominalist claim. There is a good deal 
of work on “cooperative” federalism—the institutional arrangements 
in which a complex amalgam of local, state, and federal officials 
regulate together. As the moniker suggests, however, the work on 
cooperative federalism dwells almost entirely on the happy 
dimensions of federal-state regulation. Scholars of cooperative 
federalism emphasize the ways in which joint regulation promotes 
mutual learning, healthy competition, and useful redundancy. These 
scholars neglect the uncooperative dimensions of cooperative 
federalism and the democratic elements of these bureaucratic 
arrangements. As a result, the work in federalism theory that does 
focus on political outliers and resistance—the role federalism plays in 
checking an overweening national government and promoting 
dissent—is almost entirely confined to conventional federalism 
theory, where exit is the dominant account.54 
Federalism scholarship doesn’t just neglect uncooperative 
federalism; it also neglects uncooperative localism. Federalism 
scholars, after all, are the rare academics who don’t always think that 
the principal-agent problem is a problem. To the contrary, they 
celebrate the opportunities for rebellion and contestation that 
 
 53. Although election law focuses on minority-majority districts, the main intellectual push 
behind them is that they are the best means for creating a statistically integrated legislature. In 
the words of Richard Pildes, “[t]he very theory of districted elections . . . is that democratic 
institutions are best designed by . . . fragmenting majoritarian domination. Districted elections 
empower local minorities who would otherwise be swallowed up in a system not self-consciously 
designed to ensure some representation of their interests.” Richard H. Pildes, Diffusion of 
Political Power and the Voting Rights Act, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 124 (2000).  
 54. See supra notes 11–22 and accompanying text. 
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decentralization provides. And it’s just a hop, skip, and a jump from 
theorizing about states to theorizing about the local, substate, and 
sublocal institutions where dissenters are far more likely to have such 
opportunities. As a result, federalism scholars miss many an 
opportunity for intellectual arbitrage—the chance to connect their 
work on minority-dominated governance to work done by their 
colleagues on the rights side of constitutional theory. 
B. Agency and Disloyalty 
Why, then, do scholars neglect this third avenue of minority 
influence? It’s presumably because the notion of agency would 
require us to celebrate chaos and dissensus within a bureaucratic 
system, something that sits uneasily with most of us. When the subject 
is the administrative state, Weber is foremost in our minds, not 
Tocqueville. When we talk about democracy, we routinely celebrate 
the idiosyncratic dissenter, the nobility of resistance, the glory in 
getting things wrong, and the wild patchwork of views that make up 
the polity. When thinking about administrative arrangements, we 
laud bureaucratic efficiency, worry about local incompetence, and 
have a strong impulse to quash local rebellion. What is celebrated in 
the democratic realm is condemned in the bureaucratic one. 
If one were to press the point, surely most would admit that it’s 
useful to have institutionalized channels for dissent within federal 
administrative agencies.55 Nonetheless, the notion that local or state 
agents might hijack federal policy in pursuit of their own agendas 
smacks of disloyalty. It’s one thing for dissenters to speak against the 
center; it’s quite another for them to use power the center gave them 
to thwart its wishes. 
This conception of loyalty is more robust than the one offered by 
Hirschman, who mostly thought of loyalty as a vaguely irrational 
impulse to cling to what one knew.56 It is rooted in a Weberian vision 
of bureaucracy, one that suggests (reasonably enough) that the 
principal has the right to command the agent he’s hired to carry out 
 
 55. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006) (“A critical mechanism to 
promote internal separation of powers is bureaucracy . . . . [B]ureaucracy creates a civil service 
not beholden to any particular administration and a cadre of experts with a long-term 
institutional worldview.”).  
 56. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 1, at 38, 81. 
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his bidding. It’s a notion that privileges hierarchy, uniformity, and 
clear lines of authority. 
This notion of loyalty exerts such a strong hold on us that we 
view internal resistance with suspicion even when it’s entirely lawful. 
After all, a good deal of the conduct I would term “agency” easily fits 
within legal bounds, and yet we still react to it with distaste. 
Sometimes we authorize administrative units to dissent. For instance, 
it’s lawful for juries to nullify. Similarly, we often grant states licenses 
to experiment. That’s what the Reagan administration did for states 
like Michigan and Wisconsin, whose governors then used federal 
dollars to create “welfare to work” systems with the explicit aim of 
overturning the existing regime.57 In other instances, political outliers 
simply take advantage of a gap in the federal mandate and use that 
decisionmaking space to take federal policy in a direction the center 
does not anticipate. California, for instance, has taken advantage of 
gaps in the federal regulations to enact stronger environmental 
regulations than federal officials would prefer.58 State officials less 
enamored of environmental regulation have done the same, taking 
federal policy in a deregulatory direction.59 
The fact that we intuitively equate agency with disloyalty despite 
its lawfulness may also reveal how deeply rooted exit and voice are in 
our vocabulary. We have a firm sense of what the “loyal opposition” 
is supposed to do—speak out (voice) or get out (exit). That’s why 
activities that don’t fit neatly within the exit/voice paradigm—like 
civil disobedience—can cause us to turn analytic cartwheels. 
C. The Loyal Opposition and Partial Loyalty 
Concepts like the “loyal opposition” and civil disobedience can 
also help us sort out how to think about acts of agency. Let’s start 
with those forms of agency that are plainly legal. As noted above, 
many forms of agency can fairly be understood as the actions of the 
law-loving dissenter.60 Much as dissenting speech is licensed by the 
First Amendment, these forms of agency are either explicitly licensed 
by the majority or, at least, left open to minorities in the exercise of 
their legally conferred discretion. In these instances, minorities can 
 
 57. For a description, see Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 38, at 1274–76. 
 58. For more detail, see id. at 1276–78. 
 59. See id. at 1277. 
 60. Thanks to Jiewuh Song for suggesting the phrase. 
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both challenge the majority and yet act on its behalf; they can contest 
the law at the same moment that they comply with it. 
Minorities who exercise agency, then, are acting much like 
members of the loyal opposition; they share the majority’s basic 
commitments but differ as to how those commitments ought to be 
carried out. And while they are, in fact, challenging the majority, they 
are also serving it by ensuring that the polity is thinking through its 
decisions and taking into account all the relevant concerns. That is 
precisely why we think the opposition is loyal; we understand 
contestation to serve an important role in promoting sensible 
decisions and in fostering a healthy democracy. Little wonder, then, 
that many theories in constitutional law are keyed to our need for a 
loyal opposition. The First Amendment creates room for the loyal 
opposition in the private sphere by protecting the right to speak and 
associate. Federalism and diversity make space for the loyal 
opposition in the legislative sphere. And agency makes space for the 
loyal opposition in the administrative sphere. 
The strongest forms of what I term “agency” do indeed involve 
genuine rebellion—a deliberate effort to thwart federal law, or at 
least implement it in a manner plainly inconsistent with the federal 
mandate. Consider, for instance, states’ outright refusal to implement 
portions of the Patriot Act.61 But even these strong forms of agency 
are too quickly dismissed as disloyalty. Actions that involve direct 
challenges to federal mandates can be undertaken in the spirit of the 
loyal opposition. In these instances, minorities share the same basic 
goal as national policymakers (good education policy, sensible 
environmental regulation) even as they differ as to how to achieve it. 
The literature on civil disobedience helps clarify the relationship 
between loyalty and resistance. Civil disobedience involves “the 
purposeful and public defiance of an established law or norm, 
undertaken with the intent of altering state policy.”62 But civil 
disobedience is not purely oppositional, at least under most 
 
 61. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). For a full analysis, see Bulman-Pozen & 
Gerken, supra note 38, at 1278–80. 
 62. David S. Meyer, Civil Disobedience, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 
60, 60 (Paul Barry Clarke & Joe Foweraker eds., 2001); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 363, 365 (1971) (defining civil disobedience within a “more or less just democratic 
state” as “a political act not only in the sense that it is addressed to the majority that holds 
political power, but also because it is an act guided and justified by political principles”). 
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influential accounts. To the contrary, it is both an act of affiliation and 
of contestation. Martin Luther King described civil disobedience as 
“break[ing] an unjust law . . . openly, lovingly.”63 In the words of John 
Rawls, “It expresses disobedience to law within the limits of fidelity 
to law . . . . The law is broken, but fidelity to law is expressed by the 
public and nonviolent nature of the act, by the willingness to accept 
the legal consequences of one’s conduct.”64 For this reason, Rawls 
termed civil disobedience “that form of dissent” that stands “at the 
boundary of fidelity to law.”65 Similarly, consider Harry Kalven’s 
evocative description of two civil-rights protests: 
  These are structured ceremonials of protest; they are not riots. 
The demonstrators were not . . . trying to bring government to a 
halt; rather they were expressing the concern of the young Negro 
about his situation. What was symbolized was a deep grievance, a 
break with the society. They prayed, they pledged allegiance to the 
flag, they sang “God Bless America,” and—in [one instance]—they 
even stopped for a red traffic light.66 
Notice that the power of civil disobedience hinges on the 
dissenters’ reaffirmation of their membership in the community. 
These acts of affiliation during the moment of dissent help protesters, 
to borrow a phrase Kalven uses elsewhere, “trap democracy in its 
own decencies.”67 
 
 63. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in A TESTAMENT OF 
HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 289, 294 
(James M. Washington ed., 1986). 
 64. RAWLS, supra note 62, at 366; see also KING, supra note 63, at 294 (“[A]n individual 
who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and willingly accepts the penalty by staying 
in jail to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the 
very highest respect for law.”). Indeed, even conventional dissent is not always purely 
oppositional. Dissenters often affirm their loyalty to the polity while declaring their 
disagreement. See generally, e.g., Robert N. Strassfeld, Lose in Vietnam, Bring the Boys Home, 
82 N.C. L. REV. 1891 (2004) (documenting the strategy of Vietnam protesters to counter their 
opponents’ equation of dissent and disloyalty). Steven Shiffrin even goes so far as to argue that 
dissent functions like a “cultural glue that binds [dissenters] to the political community.” 
STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 18 (1999). 
 65. RAWLS, supra note 62, at 367. 
 66. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 6.  
 67. HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 67 (1965). The 
lessons Kalven draws from civil-rights protests have apparently not been lost on the mayor of 
San Francisco, whose staff “made sure that when the mayor came out swinging against Bush’s 
backing for a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage, he was standing in front of 
an American flag.” Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, Newsom Hasn’t Been Ad-Libbing, S.F. 
CHRON., Feb. 29, 2004, at A19. 
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Similarly, when minorities exercise agency—when they use their 
power as national agents to challenge the policy they are 
implementing—they look a good deal like civil disobedients. By 
virtue of their membership in the national governance structure, their 
challenges are understood as public and authoritative, not particular 
and private. The decisions minorities render are decisions of the 
polity, blessed as the decisions of the national government even as 
they depart from the national majority’s preferences. And these 
decisions ensure that national policymaking reflects the heterogeneity 
of the national polity. If we think of civil disobedience as an activity 
designed to signal partial disagreement, agency offers an institutional 
channel for achieving the same end. 
On this view, agency fits nicely with Walzer’s conception of civil 
disobedience, which he argues involves “partial loyalty” rather than 
disloyalty. Walzer argues that civil disobedience stems from the 
problem of overlapping membership: “When obligations incurred in 
some small group come into conflict with obligations incurred in a 
larger, more inclusive group, generally the state.”68 Someone engaged 
in civil disobedience, Walzer believes, has only “partial claims” 
against the state;69 his “loyalties are divided,” as “he is not in any 
simple sense a citizen” or a rebel but is instead partially both, 
precisely because “the processes through which men incur obligations 
are unavoidably pluralistic.”70 Civil disobedients are thus “partial 
members[,] . . . partial emigrants, partial aliens, partial rebels.”71 
Others have written in this vein. Hannah Arendt, for instance, termed 
civil disobedients “nothing but the latest form of voluntary 
association.”72 Similarly, Stephen Carter has argued that communities 
of faith are “separate sovereigns,” dissenting communities embedded 
within the polity and yet not fully part of it.73 
Dissent that takes the form of agency can also be understood as 
an instantiation of the practice of pluralism, at least on Walzer’s view. 
As with Walzer’s account of civil disobedience, this form of dissent 
allows citizens to engage in partial rebellion and thus “builds loyalty 
 
 68. Michael Walzer, The Obligation to Disobey, 77 ETHICS 163, 167 (1967). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 169–70. 
 71. Id. at 170. 
 72. HANNAH ARENDT, Civil Disobedience, in CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 49, 96 (1972); see 
also id. at 75–76. 
 73. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON LAW, 
RELIGION, AND LOYALTY 78 (1998); see also id. at 27–31. 
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not only toward the state but also against it.”74 Agency does not 
demand an external emigration to accompany what Walzer terms the 
“internal emigration” of a dissenter.75 Instead, minorities engaged in 
rebellious state or local policymaking are embedded insiders, not 
autonomous outsiders. They wield the power of the majority against 
itself. A minority can speak for the nation, just like any other citizen. 
To be sure, those engaged in dissent often affirm their membership in 
the polity. But here the polity, in effect, returns the favor by 
blessing—if only temporarily—the decision as its own. 
Notions like partial loyalty and the loyal opposition might also 
help us sort agency from genuine disloyalty. The loyal opposition, for 
instance, understands the lesson of dualism.76 There are decisions, and 
then there are decisions. Although the loyal opposition can properly 
challenge decisions that have not yet been fully aired or vetted, we 
expect it to withdraw when the issue has been properly teed up and a 
national consensus has been reached. The loyal opposition, similarly, 
should take into account the costs of resistance. We expect it to act 
differently during times of emergency, for instance. Even during 
periods of normal politics, we expect the loyal opposition to exercise 
judgment; its job isn’t to challenge everything merely for the sake of 
doing so. Similarly, just as we expect civil disobedients to accept the 
punishment for their law breaking, so too we might expect dissenters 
who exercise agency to accept the center’s rebuke and step down 
when the center plays its trump card. Think, for instance, of the City 
of San Francisco, which stopped issuing same-sex marriage licenses 
the moment a court issued the appropriate order.77 
IV. IS AGENCY WORTH CELEBRATING? 
Imagining agency as a path of influence would require us to 
celebrate rather than mourn the fact that Tocqueville’s democracy 
fails to produce Weber’s bureaucracy. In our mostly decentralized, 
partially politicized bureaucracy, minorities can contest state and 
federal policy from within rather than criticize it from without. 
Everyday citizens and political elites serve as nominal bureaucrats for 
 
 74. MICHAEL WALZER, The Problem of Citizenship, in OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON 
DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, AND CITIZENSHIP 203, 220 (1970). 
 75. Walzer, supra note 68, at 14. 
 76. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). 
 77. Lockyer v. City of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 467 (Cal. 2004); Dean E. Murphy, San 
Francisco Forced To Halt Gay Marriages, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 12, 2004, at A1. 
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the federal government. The center’s agents can exercise agency in 
their ongoing debate with the center. 
One obvious reason for neglecting this topic is that it’s simply not 
worth celebrating. Can anything be said in favor of Tocquevillian 
administration? Such a system plainly has costs, so familiar to all of us 
that we have a name for them (principal-agent problems). The 
question is whether these costs are so weighty that we should confine 
the “loyal opposition” to voice and exit and cut off opportunities for 
minorities to exercise agency (assuming it were possible to do so). 
Here I don’t want to make the witless claim. I won’t argue that 
the principal-agent problem is never a problem or suggest that we 
should ignore the many conventional arguments that favor Weber 
over Tocqueville. But we know those arguments, and we don’t have a 
full account of the alternative. My goal is to illuminate a set of 
arguments that are too often excluded from the cost-benefit calculus, 
not to do the math for you in advance. I will talk about some of those 
costs here, but only those that emerge when you think about minority 
influence in the terms I propose. I thus won’t canvass the litany of 
grievances we conventionally associate with the principal-agent 
problem. 
While much of my work has focused on the benefits generally 
associated with minority-dominated governance, here I want to focus 
on what makes agency distinctive as an avenue of minority 
influence—what differentiates it from voice and exit. The arguments 
pivot off the features I’ve already identified in explaining why 
minorities themselves might value agency: it gives them the 
opportunity to exercise control rather than voice and to do so inside 
the system rather than outside of it. That’s all well and good for self-
interested minorities, of course, but what about the polity? Are there 
benefits to having a channel of influence that gives minorities control 
without forcing them to exit—a channel that grants both majority 
status and insider status in the decisionmaking process? 
One crude way to break down the work in constitutional theory 
involving voice and exit is to notice that it is largely preoccupied with 
two projects. The first is dialogue—ensuring a healthy amount of 
debate and disagreement within our democracy. The second is 
integration—ensuring that our fractious polity remains a polity. Exit, 
voice, and agency all further these goals, but they do so in quite 
different ways. 
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A. Dialogue 
If we turn to one of the other main projects undergirding much 
of the work on constitutional theory—promoting healthy levels of 
dialogue and dissent—agency similarly offers some advantages over 
its institutional competitors. 
Think about the rights side of the equation. We value the First 
Amendment because it offers dissenters voice (or, if you prefer, an 
exit option—that is, the exit option afforded by private speech or 
association). If we thought of agency as a third avenue for influence, 
we might imagine it serving as a competing or complementary 
channel for dissent. The same is true of federalism, which has long 
been thought to serve the same type of dialogic values as the First 
Amendment. Indeed, if we accept one of federalism’s core insights—
that it is useful for governing institutions to serve as challengers to the 
national government78—we might think it is useful to introduce 
sources of contestation and dissent within the behemoth we call the 
Fourth Branch. 
When states and localities are part of a federal administrative 
scheme, nominally bureaucratic roles are carried out by politicians, 
bureaucrats, and those who merge political savvy with technical 
expertise. This type of arrangement embeds would-be dissenters into 
the federal regime. It thus introduces the dynamics of federalism into 
 
 78. Consider the extant work, beginning with Ernest Young’s argument analogizing 
states to the “shadow governments” found in European systems. Ernest A. Young, Welcome to 
the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1277, 1286–87 (2004); see also Merritt, supra note 20, at 7. For a discussion of the role that 
states play in monitoring federal officials and training the loyal opposition, see Akhil Reed 
Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 499–505 (1991); 
see also Baker & Young, supra note 21, at 137–38. Andrzej Rapaczynski depicts local power as 
a “counterbalance” to federal lockup. Rapaczynski, supra note 17, at 386. Vicki Jackson 
observes that the usefulness of “direct[ing] political activism and organizing” to states is 
precisely because their borders do not map on to divisive political identities. Vicki C. Jackson, 
Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 
2221–23 (1998). Steven Calabresi asserts that “federalism sometimes can make minority groups 
feel secure while deemphasizing the lines of political and social cleavage.” Calabresi, supra note 
21, at 763–64. Judith Resnik discusses localism’s role in promoting international rights and 
transnational cooperation. Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent 
Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE. L.J. 1564 (2006). Daryl 
Levinson describes the role political parties play in diffusing power vertically. See generally 
Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
915, 938–44 (2005).  
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the Fourth Branch, ensuring that federalism serves as a safeguard for 
a well-functioning administrative system.79 
Agency also allows minorities to pursue their goals through 
administrative channels as well as political ones. Minorities thus have 
an additional set of leverage points in pursuing their agenda. Better 
yet, agency gives them the opportunity to offer a real-life 
instantiation of their views rather than an abstract argument in 
support of their claims. They need not merely claim that something 
can be done; they can show it can be done within the existing federal 
regime. Finally, as noted above, agency may be uniquely well suited 
for agenda setting. Precisely because it involves decisions made inside 
the system, it may be more likely to elicit a reaction from the center 
than will voice or exit. 
One might respond that it is absolutely essential for challenges to 
the federal government to be protected by something—state 
sovereignty or a robust form of autonomy at the governance level; a 
constitutional right at the individual or group level. After all, if you 
are challenging the center, what good does it do to enact a policy only 
to have it reversed? Exit offers protection against reversal; agency 
does not. 
It is certainly right to think that in some cases, agency won’t 
amount to much as a channel of dissent. Some challenges will get 
squashed and squashed quickly. There is a risk that dialogue between 
the center and the periphery will be one-sided, with the center’s only 
response a resounding “no.” For dissenters, agenda-setting power is 
as volatile as it is valuable. Issues can get put on the national agenda 
too quickly. Minorities’ decisions may thus produce backlash—not 
just political backlash, which can be elicited by other forms of dissent, 
but backlash that takes a legal and thus more permanent form as the 
center takes the steps necessary to reverse the periphery’s decision. 
There is a risk, however, that we overestimate these costs in 
thinking about dissent. That’s because we ignore the trade-off that 
the notion of agency illuminates: protection from reversal also means 
one is outside of the system, and it might sometimes be just as useful 
to be making policy inside the system even if one risks reversal. 
This is a bit abstract, so let me ground it with an example. Think 
about the difference between two same-sex marriage decisions that 
 
 79. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 38, at 1286.  
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occurred at roughly the same time: one in San Francisco,80 the other 
in Massachusetts.81 Massachusetts’s decision fell squarely within 
the conventional federalism account—an exit option. Its 
decision was protected by sovereignty and thus shielded from 
reversal by the national majority. When San Francisco began 
licensing same-sex couples, in contrast, it could make no claim of 
sovereignty. Its decision could be reversed, and it was.82 
Surely most people think that Massachusetts made the decision 
that really mattered for getting same-sex marriage on the national 
agenda. Sovereignty protected that decision from reversal, something 
that gave the state the power to continue with the experiment, to 
provide a real-life instantiation of its views that still stands today. No 
doubt this fact was important in shaping the ongoing debate. But 
notice that while Massachusetts’s decision was initially condemned, it 
dropped out of the ongoing national discussion until recently. Had 
Massachusetts been fully separate from the United States—had it 
been France or the Netherlands—one wonders whether the decision 
would have elicited any response in this country. 
San Francisco, in contrast, made the most of its status as an 
agent. Consistent with a sovereignty approach, Massachusetts’s 
leadership tried to confine the effects of its decision to its own 
territory by limiting same-sex marriage licenses to state residents.83 
San Francisco’s leaders, however, leveraged the city’s status as one 
actor embedded in a larger system by issuing marriage licenses to 
anyone willing to make the trip to California. This choice forced 
political actors in the states and the federal government—many of 
whom had previously ducked the issue—to take a stand on whether 
those marriages were valid. San Francisco, in other words, took 
advantage of its status as one part of a larger policymaking regime to 
wield one of the most powerful tools that a dissenter can have—the 
power to set the agenda. 
To get some sense of why agenda setting matters so much to 
dissenters, think about the First Amendment. Our iconic image is of a 
person standing on a soapbox. Now think about what you do when 
 
 80. Lockyer, 95 P.3d 459.  
 81. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 82. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 83. Pam Belluck, Romney Won’t Let Gay Outsiders Wed in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 25, 2004, at N1. The state ultimately abandoned this policy and ended up marrying same-
sex couples from out of state. Katie Zezima, Massachusetts: Same-Sex Couples from Other 
States May now Marry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2008, at A13. 
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you see someone on that soapbox. You walk on by. That might seem 
like a trivial point. But often the majority’s best strategy in dealing 
with dissent will be radio silence, ignoring the challenge rather than 
engaging with it. That option simply became unavailable when San 
Francisco took advantage of its status as an agent in a larger 
administrative structure and began marrying people from across the 
country. 
Because San Francisco was a servant rather than a sovereign, an 
agent rather than a principal, it could be reversed . . . and reversed 
and reversed and reversed. But, here again, one wonders whether San 
Francisco had more of an effect on this debate precisely because it 
repeatedly forced the majority to engage. Attempts to shut down the 
city’s efforts prompted two high-profile, state-court battles, backlash 
in the form of an initiative, and backlash to the backlash initiative. 
The city is now engaged in a third, high-profile court case that is 
before the Supreme Court at the time of this writing.84 And note that 
Massachusetts has recently reemerged in this debate only because a 
judge held that the federal government could not deny marriage 
benefits to same-sex couples married within the state,85 thus 
leveraging Massachusetts’s status as an integrated part of the federal 
regime in order to force the national government to engage. Should 
this effort be short-circuited by an adverse ruling, then it is hard to 
tell whether, in the end, Massachusetts will look like the solitary 
dissenter on the soap box, precisely because it stands outside the 
system and cannot be reversed, whereas San Francisco, playing the 
servant’s role, will ultimately do more to push the same-sex marriage 
debate forward in the long run. 
Note the connection between these arguments and those I made 
earlier about agency. Here again, we see the same relationship 
between exit and voice, outsiders and insiders. It is precisely when 
states and localities are integrated into a national scheme—rather 
than standing separate and apart from it—that they have the power 
to set the agenda, to force a reluctant national elite to engage. 
Note also the connections here between agency and civil 
disobedience. Each forces the majority to act—either to overrule the 
outlier decision (agency) or to prosecute the dissenters (civil 
 
 84. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir), cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 
133 S. Ct. 786 (Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144). In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that I 
supervise a program that has allowed Yale Law students to work on this case. 
 85. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2012). 
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disobedience). Both thus, to borrow a phrase from Martin Luther 
King, help “create . . . a crisis and establish such creative tension that 
a community . . . is forced to confront the issue.”86 Like Alexander M. 
Bickel’s account of civil disobedience, agency is “an exercise of power 
in the sense in which Burke defined it”: an “attempt to coerce the 
legal order.”87 Agency, in short, offers a key advantage precisely 
because it cedes to would-be dissenters control over decisions without 
forcing them to exit. In contrast to exit and voice, it helps ensure that 
dialogue between the periphery and center—at the heart of both First 
Amendment and federalism theory—actually happens. 
If we are thinking about costs and benefits, of course, there are 
many instances when the polity might sensibly prefer not to have a 
decision forced upon it. Sometimes the issue has been settled, and 
properly so. We might well think in these situations that the only 
appropriate channels for dissent are voice and exit: speak up or get 
out. And a national government simply can’t function if it has to 
quash local rebellion whenever it makes a decision. 
Agency, though, also offers something that the polity might find 
useful when compared to voice and exit. The model presumes that the 
center can and should quash local rebellion when it sees fit. Exit—a 
conventional federalism model or a robust right to associate—shields 
policies that depart from a treasured national consensus. Agency, in 
contrast, makes space for the center to reverse the periphery when 
the latter pushes too hard. All the national majority needs to do is 
spend the political capital necessary to do so. In some situations, then, 
agency offers the polity a good deal more flexibility in dealing with 
would-be dissenters than exit provides. 
Another feature that distinguishes agency from voice or exit is 
that it extends the time frame for dissent.88 Those outside the national 
policymaking apparatus often have only a few realistic opportunities 
to influence a policy—for example, just before Congress passes a law 
or an agency issues a regulation. In these situations, the arguments 
aired by dissenters will often be cast in abstract terms, a great deal of 
pressure will be placed on the politicking that occurs ex ante, and the 
 
 86. KING, supra note 63, at 291; see also RAWLS, supra note 62, at 366 (“By engaging in 
civil disobedience a minority forces the majority to consider whether it wishes to have its actions 
construed in this way, or whether, in view of the common sense of justice, it wishes to 
acknowledge the legitimate claims of the minority.”). 
 87. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 99 (1975). 
 88. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 38, at 1292–93. 
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key players in the debate will be interest groups, lobbyists, and 
politicians. 
If would-be dissenters enjoy opportunities to exercise agency, the 
ongoing conversation between the center and the periphery will look 
quite different, something that can be characterized as a feature or a 
bug. On the positive side, the debate is likely to be informed by facts 
on the ground. Any debate that takes place ex post will, of course, 
offer a better sense of what a policy looks like in practice. And 
dissenters who serve as agents of the center are likely to have a closer 
view of the facts on the ground and access to a wider range of facts. 
Giving would-be dissenters two bites at the policymaking apple might 
lower the stakes of the debate, as dissenters will know that they will 
have a chance to soften the edges of a policy they oppose. The 
conversation between the center and the periphery won’t be a one-off 
battle, but is likely to be iterative. Finally, ex post policymaking 
debates are likely to involve a different set of actors than ex ante 
ones. These debates are more likely to include experts, or at least 
those with experience and a shared sense of mission. 
There are, of course, costs to extending the time frame for 
debate. It allows dissenters to pursue a “death by a thousand cuts” 
strategy in challenging national policy. It gives them an opportunity 
to resist a policy sub rosa, without having to make their case on a 
public stage. Iterative processes aren’t always superior ones. 
Although we typically imagine an iterative process to be a dialogic 
one, an iterative process can also convert a one-off battle into an 
ongoing war. And while these debates include a different set of 
decisionmakers, conversations within the informal, administrative 
realm may be less transparent—and thus less likely to include 
representatives of all stakeholding groups—than debates that take 
place during legislating or rulemaking. 
Dissent that takes place in the interstices of federal policy will 
also look quite different from dissent that takes the form of voice. 
Agency cedes to dissenters genuine power—the power to make 
national policy rather than merely complain about it. But it also 
requires that dissenters pour their complaints into a fairly narrow 
policymaking space. Voice, in contrast, gives dissenters a chance to 
“get [their] genius expressed whole and entire.”89 When they speak, 
they can offer a fully articulated argument in favor of their position. 
 
 89. VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE’S OWN 75 (reprt. 1991) (1929). With apologies to 
Virginia Woolf. 
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When they vote, they can express their disagreement across a far 
wider range of issues than they will encounter as agents within one 
policy domain or another.90 
B. Integration 
Think, for instance, about how “control without exit” fits with 
the extant work on dissent and the project of integration. This is a 
project I’ve taken up elsewhere,91 so here I’ll offer just a thumbnail 
sketch. Many argue that the purpose of the First Amendment is to 
integrate political outliers into the polity.92 But, interestingly enough, 
the strategies we have for doing so at least partially reify their status 
as minorities and outsiders. The rights afforded to dissenters push 
them outside of the project of governance. They can speak their 
mind, but only when they speak for themselves. They can speak truth 
to power, but not with it. 
Similarly, while federalism involves minorities in the project of 
governance, it does so only by allowing them to migrate to separate 
polities rather than to help govern on behalf of the polity. When 
dissenters are engaged in the project of governance inside the 
national system, they are condemned to the status of perpetual losers. 
It’s not hard to imagine that political minorities might value the 
chance to serve as policymaking insiders rather than autonomous 
outsiders. They might value the chance to stand in the shoes of the 
majority, to develop a different set of participatory skills, to enjoy the 
efficacy associated with agency. Agency, then, might exercise a 
centripetal force, pulling outliers into the national polity. 
Agency, of course, involves costs as well. Even if we discount the 
costs conventionally associated with bureaucratic dissensus, we might 
worry that agency can undermine the project of integration. While it’s 
all well and good to create opportunities for political minorities to 
enjoy decisionmaking control, agency carries with it the risk of 
reversal. And it might be quite debilitating for minorities to see their 
decisions subject to immediate reversal—all that work for nothing. 
Indeed, reversal might cause minorities to be less invested in the 
process going forward. 
 
 90. Thanks to Yair Listokin for pushing me on this point. 
 91. See generally, e.g., CARTER, supra note 73, at 97–98; Gerken, supra note 26; Heather K. 
Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099 (2005). 
 92. See, e.g., SHIFFRIN, supra note 64, at 18; Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory 
of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 885 (1963).  
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Or it might not. Political setbacks can pull people still deeper 
into the process. Consider, for instance, the path the Christian Right 
took into politics. Early defeats galvanized more organizing. 
Decisions on abortion led to increasingly creative legislation and 
newly minted arguments designed to counter critics. Decisions on 
school prayer led members of the Christian Right to take over school 
boards. 
These interactions didn’t just pull political outliers into national 
politics; it caused them to moderate their arguments as they poured 
their views into a small policymaking space and carried on their 
continuing conversation with the center. Pro-life arguments, for 
instance, now routinely include appeals to the needs of women.93 
Supporters of religion in schools have gone from teaching the 
Creation to teaching the controversy. 
 
*** 
 
When one lays voice, exit, and agency side by side, it becomes 
clear that agency offers a competing and complementary channel for 
minority influence. Voice and exit have long been thought to play 
important roles in holding a fractious national polity together. 
Agency can play the same role because it offers minorities control 
without exit, the status of the majority paired with the status of the 
insider. 
CONCLUSION 
Let me conclude by returning to the puzzle with which I began. 
We are all aware of the principal-agent problem. We are all aware of 
the power that agents wield in a highly decentralized, partially 
politicized system like our own. But these institutional 
arrangements—which will only become more important as local, 
state, and national regulatory structures become more integrated—
have long been neglected by constitutional theorists. Constitutional 
theory has devoted a great deal of energy to the question of what a 
democracy owes its minorities. We have fully theorized accounts of 
voice and exit on both the structural and the rights side of the 
equation. But we have spent relatively little time on the possibility 
 
 93. See Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of 
Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1688 (2008). 
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that minorities might make policy rather than complain about it, that 
they might wield power within the system rather than outside of it, 
that they might serve as connected critics rather than autonomous 
outsiders. We have missed the possibility that agency provides a third 
avenue of influence for minorities in a majoritarian system. 
None of this is to suggest that agency is without cost. But neither 
is voice nor exit (that is one of Hirschman’s key points). The fact that 
federalism involves costs doesn’t prevent us from celebrating it. The 
same should hold true of uncooperative federalism. The fact that 
dissent involves costs doesn’t prevent us from revering it; the same 
should hold true of dissenting by deciding. Even if you think that 
agency is, on balance, harmful to our constitutional scheme, at the 
very least it’s useful to recognize its existence. What is useful about 
Hirschman’s framework is that it allows us to compare and contrast 
exit and voice, two competing and complementary channels of 
minority influence. Adding a third category to Hirschman’s typology 
can only enrich our understanding of how our democracy functions. 
 
